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Abstract 
 
The merits of teacher tenure policies are currently being debated across the 
country, but little is known about their true effect on teacher performance. Critics argue 
that tenure, originally designed to provide job protection, may have adverse effects on 
teacher quality if job security removes incentives to perform at higher levels. Using a 
nationally representative survey of high school students, I examine the effect of receiving 
tenure on student achievement. Because tenure laws vary across states, I am able to 
compare teachers with the same level of experience but who differ in tenure status. I find 
no significant relationship between a teacher’s tenure status and classroom performance. 
The magnitude of the effect of tenure increases when I limit the analysis to more similar 
groups of teachers, though it remains statistically insignificant. I argue that further 
research is necessary to better understand the implications of tenure policies.  
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Introduction  
The passage of the No Child Left Behind Act in 2001 refocused America’s 
attention on efforts to reform the US public education system. A variety of policies, 
ranging from introducing new accountability standards to promoting school choice and 
competition, are currently being examined by researchers and lawmakers alike in an 
effort to determine what changes can be made to public education in order to improve its 
quality. The importance of teacher quality is widely recognized as one of the most critical 
components of successful education and so policies that aim to improve teacher 
performance through the use of incentives are gaining momentum. 
Despite many findings that improvement in quality is associated with significant 
increases in student achievement (Aaronson et al., 2007), research has yet to pinpoint 
which teacher characteristics are most indicative of quality. For example, measurable 
teacher characteristics (such as race, gender, education history, or years of teaching 
experience) only account for 3% of a teacher’s influence on student achievement 
(Goldhaber, 2002) and a teacher’s experience is not significantly related to student 
achievement following the first few years in the classroom (Rivkin, 2005). These findings 
suggest that hard to measure teacher characteristics, such as personal motivation, job 
satisfaction, or patience and personality are the chief determinants of performance. 
Policies most likely to have a large impact on improving teacher quality may therefore be 
those that target positive change in these characteristics. Policymakers have attempted to 
address these issues through the evaluation and implementation of programs that provide 
incentives for teachers to improve.   
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One such program is teacher tenure, which creates incentives for teachers by 
providing job security. Public school teachers in every state are awarded tenure after 
completing a probationary period, the length of which is determined by state law. Tenure 
policies consist of two primary components. The first part is an automatically renewing 
employment contract, which is granted after completion of the probationary period and 
may be terminated only for reasons specified by law. The second component is the right 
of due process for a tenured teacher in the event that his or her employment contract is 
terminated. This permits the teacher to appeal to a state board and argue his or her case 
against the school district attempting to fire the teacher, which may be difficult and very 
costly for the school district.  
Teacher tenure policies may provide teachers with incentives to either improve or 
diminish their teaching quality. If tenure gives a teacher confidence in job security and a 
sense that he or she is free of political pressures within a school system, it may improve 
teacher motivation, satisfaction, and overall productivity. This can also encourage 
teachers to try new methods or take risks in the classroom without the fear of losing one’s 
job if the methods fail. In addition, the desire to obtain tenure may motivate new teachers 
to work harder in order to earn the approval of a school board or administrator. However, 
one could argue that tenure policies may have an opposite effect by removing incentives 
for a teacher to perform well. Once a teacher secures tenure, the link between teacher 
performance and career or financial incentives is severed. Teachers know that it would be 
difficult and costly for the school board to fire them. They therefore have little financial 
incentive to perform well.    
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In 1934, when tenure laws were on the books in only a handful of states, Willard 
S. Elsbree said, “Tenure is a subject which many educators have discussed, but few have 
studied” (Elsbree, 1934). Today, nearly one hundred years since the first tenure policy 
was implemented in 1910 (Elsbree, 1934), every state has some tenure policy in place 
(see Figure 1). Yet while policymakers think tenure policies may affect teacher’s 
productivity, there has still been very little research conducted on the subject. In 
Washington D.C., for example, School Chancellor Michelle Rhee has proposed a plan to 
offer current teachers a choice of giving up tenure in return for a chance at higher, 
performance-based wages or of keeping tenure and receiving lower raises.  As the debate 
over teacher tenure continues, research examining its effect on student achievement will 
be essential to make effective policy decisions. The objective of this paper is therefore to 
begin the research process and examine the effect of tenure on teacher effectiveness.  
  
Literature Review  
Literature on Teacher Tenure  
Few studies focus directly on the effect of teacher tenure on teacher performance.  
Aaronson et al. (2007) include and analyze tenure status in their regression model 
explaining the impact of teacher characteristics on student performance. Using data 
collected from Chicago Public High Schools, Aaronson et al. aim to identify teacher 
characteristics correlated with student gains in math and, more generally, further 
understand the relationship between teacher quality and student achievement. The authors 
find that “variables that determine compensation in Chicago – tenure, advanced degrees, 
and teaching certification” – only explain about one percent of the variation in estimates  
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of teacher quality. Tenure status, specifically, had no statistically significant correlation 
with teacher quality. However, the effect of tenure on teacher quality was estimated 
without fully addressing the complex relationship between the effects of tenure and 
teaching experience. Tenure status is closely related to teacher experience, and it is 
important to create a research design that disentangles tenure effects from returns to 
experience. In Aaronson et al., years of teaching experience was measured by “potential 
experience,” which is the age of a teacher minus years of education minus five (the age at 
which an individual begins schooling). In other words, potential experience is simply a 
measure of the number of years an individual is in the workforce, assuming that he or she 
completes education and immediately enters the workforce without taking any time off. 
This method of determining years of experience will be incorrect to the extent that 
teachers take nontraditional career paths or hold multiple jobs in different districts.  
Using data from the National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988, I created a 
variable of “potential experience” for all math teachers in the sample and compared it to 
the teachers’ reported years of experience. Figure 2 is a scatter plot of my findings, and it 
indicates that potential experience and true experience are often not equal. If potential 
experience perfectly predicted total experience, one would expect to see a linear line of 
the function Y=X, or total experience = potential experience. But as depicted by the fitted 
values line, this is not the case. Furthermore, the regression of total experience on 
potential experience produces estimates contrary to the assumption that potential 
experience predicts total experience. These regression coefficients are reported in Table 
1. The constant term shows that, on average, the potential experience measure will 
predict that a teacher with no years of experience actually has approximately 7.07 years  
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of experience. The coefficient on total experience, 0.93, means potential experience 
predicts an additional full year of teaching experience for a teacher with only 0.93 
additional years of total teaching experience. Taken together, these results show that 
potential experience measures initially overestimate the true number of years of 
experience and then continue to predict higher levels of experience than a teacher truly 
has. Additionally, Table 2 depicts the result of a t-test for which the null hypothesis is 
that potential experience is equal to total experience. Not only can the null hypothesis be 
rejected, but also the average size of the difference between the two measures is just over 
six years. This magnitude of a difference indicates that potential experience is a highly 
unreliable predictor of a teacher’s experience and, instead, it drastically overestimates the 
true value of a teacher’s experience. Because experience is so correlated with tenure 
status and potential experience proves to be a poor predictor of total experience, the 
results of the Aaronson et al. study may not accurately estimate the effect of tenure on 
teacher performance. Furthermore, the measurement error for experience may bias the 
estimates of both tenure and experience toward zero because the error is not correlated 
with student test score gains. This impacts the variance of and adds noise to the estimates. 
A more precise estimate may result from using data on true, reported years of teaching 
experience instead.   
In another study, Thomas A. Kersten (2006) discusses possible negative outcomes 
of tenure.  Kersten surveyed a simple random sample of 291 Illinois school board 
presidents. Most strikingly, 51% of the respondents agreed that “eliminating teacher 
tenure would increase student achievement,” suggesting that tenure may be a “primary 
barrier to student achievement.”  Additional responses show that an overwhelming  
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majority (91%) of respondents agreed that “tenure law inhibits the dismissal of below 
average teachers.” These strong negative opinions generate a case for empirical research 
to appropriately determine whether these arguments have merit and should be factored 
into the policymaking process.  
  
Teacher Incentives and Merit Pay  
Policymakers have considered and implemented a variety of alternative policies in 
an effort to create incentives for teachers to improve performance. Merit pay programs, 
for example, attempt to more effectively link teacher performance and pay. Public school 
teacher compensation is generally based on a rigid pay scale determined by two teacher 
characteristics: the highest degree obtained and the number of years of teaching 
experience. Merit pay programs, in comparison, provide higher pay – either through 
raises or bonuses – to teachers with high levels of performance. Literature on the 
effectiveness of merit pay is inconclusive. Dee and Keys (2004) used data from 
Tennessee’s Project STAR to evaluate the effects of Tennessee’s highly comprehensive 
merit pay system, the Career Ladder Evaluation System. Their research found that 
teachers who placed onto the “career ladder” after meeting a set of requirements were 
associated with student math score gains of nearly 3 percent. Eberts et al. (2002) found 
that a merit pay program in Michigan was successful at meeting its primary goal of 
increasing course completion rates. However, the program did not have positive effects 
on other, secondary, desired outcomes. For example, the program had no effect on 
student GPA, reduced the daily attendance rate, and increased the percentage of students 
who failed. The authors suggest that merit pay is only successful at producing those  
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outcomes for which teachers are directly rewarded – student retention in this example. 
Further research on merit pay suggests that it is most effective when awarded selectively 
(Figlio and Kenny, 2007) and in school districts that have the least parental oversight 
(Figlio and Kenny, 2007) and that have a lower degree of union influence (Ballou, 2001). 
These findings suggest that when administrators are freer to use and target a school’s 
resources to achieve specific results, incentives are more likely to be successful at 
improving teacher performance. Although merit pay differs from tenure policies in many 
ways, empirical research on the effect of merit pay as an incentive can provide a 
framework to better understand incentive forces that also relate to tenure.  
  
Teacher Characteristics Related to Effectiveness  
The extensive literature on teacher effectiveness identifies many factors that are 
associated with student achievement. These correlations help explain the link between 
teacher quality and student performance. By taking them into account throughout my 
analysis, I can more effectively isolate and estimate the effect of tenure on teacher 
performance. 
Experience. Most researchers acknowledge that the effect of an additional year of 
teaching experience on student achievement levels off after the first few years of teaching 
(Rockoff, 2004; Rivkin et al., 2005) and some argue that this effect eventually recedes 
(Aaronson et al., 2007). Wayne and Youngs (2003) assert that a review of literature 
shows generally positive effects of experience on teacher quality. Nonetheless they note 
that these findings are “difficult to interpret” due to factors not accounted for in most 
models such as changes in motivation, personal life situation (children, divorce, etc.), and  
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labor market changes over time, as well as the recognition that teachers who stay in the 
profession and have many years of experience may be very different from teachers that 
leave after only a few years.  
In addition, there is no research that explains why the effect of experience flattens 
out when it does. A ceiling effect whereby teachers will ultimately reach some maximum 
level of effectiveness after gaining experience and confidence in the classroom should be 
expected, but it is unclear why this tends to happen at the same time that most states grant 
tenure (two to four years). This leads to an important question of whether this connection 
is merely coincidence or if there is a more complex relationship at play in which tenure 
status prompts the estimated effects of experience to taper off prematurely. 
Certification Status. Goldhaber and Brewer (2000) used data from NELS:88 to 
determine the effects of different teacher certification levels on student achievement. 
They find that the type (standard, emergency, probationary, or private) of certification 
that a teacher holds is related to student outcomes. Additionally, the students of teachers 
certified “out of field” do less well than the students of teachers certified in the subject 
matter being taught. The strongest finding is that students of teachers with standard 
certification in math do better than students with teachers that have either no certification 
or private school certification in math, but their findings are relatively weak. Although 
one might expect the effects of certification status to relate to those of tenure status, since 
it is often based on years of experience, this is not the case. Probationary certification 
lasts for the first few years in which a teacher holds his or her position, similar to the 
probationary status that a teacher has until obtaining tenure, but unlike obtaining standard 
certification, acquiring tenure provides teachers with benefits – mainly increased job  
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security – that may affect a teacher’s quality and alter incentives to perform at high 
levels.   
Race, Gender, and Ethnicity. Several studies have considered the effects of 
teachers’ race, gender, and ethnicity (RGE) on student performance. Ehrenberg et al. 
(1995) used NELS:88 data and a regression modeled on the education production 
function to conclude that, while there are some relationships between these demographic 
traits and student productivity, they are relatively small. The study found that while 
teacher RGE by itself is not related to student achievement, combinations of a specific 
gender with a certain race or ethnicity may produce statistically significant correlations 
for a given subject. For example, black male science teachers are associated with 
academic gains for black male, black female, and white female students. In another study, 
Thomas Dee (2004) used data from the randomized Tennessee STAR experiment to 
conclude that when students and teachers are of the same race or ethnicity, an elementary 
school student’s reading and math scores are significantly higher.  
Education History. There are many factors related to a teacher’s education history 
that have been shown to be related to teacher effectiveness. These include highest degree 
obtained, coursework and subject matter of degree(s), and rating of undergraduate 
institution. A review of research shows that most findings regarding degrees held and 
coursework taken are largely inconclusive except in relation to math. High school math 
teachers with an educational background in these fields produce significant gains in 
student achievement in math (Wayne and Youngs, 2003). Research also indicates that the 
ranking of the undergraduate institution attended does have some relationship with 
student achievement gains (Wayne and Youngs, 2003), although it is possible that this  
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effect is overestimated because individuals that get into higher ranked schools are also 
likely to have other characteristics such as high levels of natural intelligence, more 
motivation, and better organization skills, all of which may also correlate with positive 
teacher effects on student achievement.  
Test Scores. A teacher’s test scores, whether on college entrance exams, tests of 
verbal skills, or teacher licensure examinations, can provide some measure of a teacher’s 
natural aptitude and intelligence level. Wayne and Youngs (2003) conducted a review of 
studies examining test scores and found that they are related to higher student 
achievement in studies in which college ratings have not been taken into account. 
Because both test scores and undergraduate institution ranking, as mentioned above, are 
related to an individual’s innate intelligence and ability to work and to learn, these 
variables may prove to be effective mechanisms to control for teacher ability in a 
regression to measure teacher effectiveness.  
  
Measuring Teacher Effectiveness  
Models to Measure Teacher Effectiveness. Teacher effectiveness is most 
commonly evaluated using a multivariate regression based on an education production 
function of the following form:  
  
Y = 0 + 1X1 + 2X2 + ...+ mXm +  
in which Y is some indicator of student achievement. The X’s represent all educational 
inputs (usually student, school and classroom, and teacher characteristics) that affect 
student achievement. Most regressions based on the education production functions that 
address teacher effectiveness use as the dependent variable some measure of student  
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performance. This measure is often the gain in a student’s test scores from an initial or 
base period to the period in which all other relevant data (including characteristics of the 
teacher in question) are observed. Independent variables in these functions tend to 
include vectors of control variables at the student level, at the school and classroom 
levels, and at the teacher level. This model fits the needs of research on teacher tenure 
because it creates a structure in which all relevant educational inputs can be held constant 
in order to determine the correlation between a specific input – tenure status – and the 
output – teacher performance – as measured by student achievement.   
   
Methodology  
I will use multiple regression analysis to determine the effect of teacher tenure 
status on teacher effectiveness. A naïve way to consider the relationship in question is 
through the following model:  
  
Yit =  0 +  1tenureit + it        (1) 
in which Y measures student i's test score gain in the subject taught by teacher t as a 
function of the tenure status of teacher t. By measuring only tenure status and student test 
score gains, this equation neglects to control for confounding variables, such as years of 
teaching experience, that may be related to both tenure status and test score gains. 
Therefore, the estimated coefficient for tenure status, β1, will be a biased estimate of the 
effect of teacher tenure on teacher performance because the error term, ε, is likely 
correlated with tenure. In order to eliminate this bias, the regression must control for 
variables that are related to tenure status that contribute to student test score gains. The 
resulting model is a form of the education production function:   
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Yit =  0 +  1tenureit +  2Tit +  3Xit +  4Sit + it    (2) 
Y still measures student i's test score gain in the subject taught by teacher t, but a measure 
of tenure is no longer the only independent variable. It is now supplemented by the 
vectors T, X, and S, which consist of variables that control for teacher, student, and 
school and classroom characteristics, respectively. This more comprehensive model takes 
into account confounding factors that may lead to a spurious correlation between teacher 
effectiveness and tenure status that would emerge from equation (1).  
  
Control Variables  
I will control for several teacher characteristics that may also explain some of the 
variation in student test scores. Variables included in the vector of teacher characteristics 
are age, gender, race and ethnicity, education history (degree(s) obtained, major field of 
study), and years of teaching experience.  
Rothstein (2008) found that teacher assignments are “not strictly exogenous, even 
conditional on a fixed individual effect” and argues that a regression measuring teacher 
performance must take into account the non-random element of classroom assignments. 
Teachers of honors classes or teachers that are known to give students harder 
assignments, for example, may attract higher performing students to their class. In order 
to control for this non-random factor of classroom assignment, student characteristics 
must be controlled for in my regression model. The student-level controls I use include 
gender, race and ethnicity, age, family income level, and parents’ education levels. In 
accordance with similar research I also include variables for family size (Hanushek, 
1971; Goldhaber and Brewer, 2000; Ehrenberg et al., 1995), special education or  
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disability status (Aaronson et al., 2007; McCaffrey et al., 2004; Jacob, 2007; Ehrenberg et 
al., 1995), English proficiency status (Ehrenberg et al., 1995), and initial academic ability 
as measured by the base year (eighth grade) subject test score (Aaronson et al., 2007; 
Goldhaber and Brewer, 2000; Ehrenberg et al., 1995). Additionally, I will include 
measures of student absenteeism from and attentiveness in class since the test scores of 
students that frequently miss class or do not pay attention are likely not an accurate 
reflection of their teachers’ quality. 
School and classroom controls used in this and similar research include school 
size, percentage of minority students enrolled (Goldhaber and Brewer, 2000; Ehrenberg 
et al., 1995), and percentage of students receiving free or reduced-price lunch, all of 
which correlate with student performance. Many models also aim to measure classroom 
effects by considering factors such as class size (Goldhaber and Brewer, 2000) in order to 
better evaluate how a teacher divides his or her attention among students in a classroom. I 
control for class size as well as additional information such as the total amount of class 
time per week in my data analysis. There may also be incentive effects on teachers that 
correlate with improvement in teaching quality and also tenure states, which vary by 
school-specific policies and reward systems. I account for one such factor – the frequency 
of classroom observation by a school administrator – in my analysis. 
Finally, I will use a set of dummy variables to control for the state in which a 
teacher is employed. Each state may have specific laws regarding teachers such as 
certification procedures or incentive-based policies. These dummies will take into 
account the fixed effects of differences across states.  
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Measuring the Effect of Tenure  
To answer the question of whether tenure status leads to a decrease in teacher 
performance, I will consider results from various permutations of equation (2). I will test 
the statistical significance of β1, the coefficient of the variable for tenure status, to 
determine whether any correlation exists between teacher effectiveness and tenure status. 
In addition, to ensure that any change in teacher effectiveness, as measured by student 
score gains, is not solely because experience effects level off, I will compare teacher 
effectiveness for each year of teaching across states that have different tenure policies by 
measuring experience relative to when a teacher obtains tenure. I will test, for example, 
whether teachers that obtained tenure after two years of teaching perform better or worse 
in the third year of teaching than teachers that will obtain tenure after four years. This 
will separate the effects of experience from the effects of tenure. If I find differences in 
teacher performance based on tenure laws, the results may suggest that it is tenure, and 
not experience, which causes teacher effects on student test scores to level off.  
  
Data 
This paper uses restricted data from the National Education Longitudinal Study of 
1988 (NELS:88), a nationally representative survey of approximately 25,000 eighth 
graders from 1,052 high schools in all fifty states in 1988. The restricted data contains a 
subset of 14,915 students who were surveyed and tested again in 1990 and 1992, and then 
surveyed two more times in 1994 and 2000.  This research will use data collected in the 
base year (eighth grade) and in the first follow-up year (tenth grade).  Data collected in 
each of these years includes responses from surveys administered to the students, their  
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parents, their school’s administrators, and to two of their teachers, as well as their test 
scores from two subject areas (out of mathematics, science, reading/English, and social 
studies/history).  Because this data links students to information on characteristics of their 
teachers and schools, the specific effects of teachers on students can be studied.   
The subject tests, developed by the Educational Testing Survey and administered 
to students between February and June of eighth, tenth, and twelfth grades, allow for 
estimates of student achievement gains from eighth to tenth grade. NELS:88 uses Item 
Response Theory (IRT) to translate scores on exams given in different grades and for 
different subjects to a common scale. Ehrenberg et al. (1995) measure student test score 
gains as the difference between the tenth grade IRT-adjusted estimated number of correct 
responses and the rescaled eighth grade IRT estimated number of correct responses in 
order to determine the effect tenth grade teacher characteristics. Because this research 
also uses eighth grade scores as a base measure for student gains and focuses on the 
effects of certain characteristics of tenth grade teachers, I will use the IRT estimated 
number correct to measure student test score gains.  
Because the NELS:88 surveys do not ask teachers whether they have tenure, I will 
infer tenure status by considering years of teaching experience as well as the state in 
which a teacher is employed.  Each state has its own tenure law, ranging from one to one 
to five years of probationary status before becoming eligible for tenure. Figure 1 shows 
the state tenure law for each state in 1990 and illustrates the variation in tenure policies 
across states. I will match years of experience to the number of years required by a state 
to obtain tenure to create a measure of tenure status. This will also permit me to compare  
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teachers with the same number of years of experience but with different tenure status in 
order to further examine the effects of tenure.    
My analysis of the effect of teacher tenure on student performance is restricted to 
a sample of students enrolled in eighth grade in 1988 and tenth grade, at a public school, 
in 1990. For a student to be used in the analysis, I must have data on that student’s test 
scores in eighth and tenth grades in a subject for which I have data on that student’s tenth 
grade teacher. Also, only teachers for whom there is data on the number of years 
employed at the current school and on the state in which a teacher is employed, such that 
state laws can be used to infer their tenure status, are retained in the sample.  Many states 
do shorten or offer individual school boards the option of shortening probationary periods 
for teachers who obtained tenure from a different school district in the state, but these 
policies vary significantly and the shortened probationary periods are often applied to 
teachers on a case-by-case basis. Due to insufficient information on teacher employment 
history, I am unable to identify those teachers that receive tenure after fewer years of 
employment in a school. Applying the aforementioned restrictions results in an analysis 
sample of 14,817 students and 6,325 teachers. 
In addition, research on the effect of teacher characteristics on student 
performance usually separates the sample by class subject and finds different results 
accordingly. For example, Rockoff (2004) concludes that the effect of a teacher’s 
experience on student achievement varies by subject. Other research on teacher race, 
gender, and ethnicity (Ehrenberg et al.) and teacher certification (Goldhaber and Brewer) 
separate the sample according to school subject as well. Therefore, in accordance with 
previous literature on teacher effects, this analysis will also evaluate the effects of teacher  
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tenure on student test score gains by subject. Once the sample is divided into the four 
subjects – English, history, math, and science – there are fewer teachers in each group. 
Basic tabulations (see Appendix Table 1) of the number of teachers for each subject show 
that when years of experience relative to obtaining tenure are very low or very high, there 
are very few teachers at each level of experience, creating an outlier problem. Because 
the precision of estimates in the analysis so strongly relies on appropriately measuring 
and controlling for teacher experience, a teacher that shares his or her number of years of 
experience with fewer than thirty other teachers of the same subject in the sample will be 
dropped from the analysis. In order to then ensure that each of the four subject groups are 
analyzed uniformly, I determined a range of experience relative to tenure for which there 
are at least thirty teachers at each level of experience in each subject group and retained 
in my sample only those teachers with experience levels within this range. As a result, 
teachers in my sample have between negative three and twenty-one years of teaching 
experience relative to earning tenure. The final sample has 12,799 observations of which 
4,322 link student English test score gains to tenth grade English teachers, 2,025 do the 
same for history, 3,427 for math, and 3,005 for science.   
 
Results 
Summary Statistics 
Tables 3 and 4 describe the characteristics of the teachers and students, 
respectively, in the remaining sample. Each table compares the distribution of 
characteristics for teachers with and without tenure.  The data in Table 3 identifies 
differences between teachers that do and do not have tenure. As one should expect,  
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tenured teachers are older and more experienced than non-tenured teachers. The 
magnitude of the difference of the variables in this sample, however, is important to note. 
Tenured teachers are approximately 7.66 years older, have about 10.6 additional years of 
total teaching experience, and have taught at their current school for just over 11.5 more 
years. On average, non-tenured teachers have taught at their current school for only about 
one and a half years, and may even still be adjusting to the school whereas the average 
tenured teacher has been there for over thirteen years and may be more comfortable with 
the school environment. If there are unobserved characteristics such as these associated 
with being older or have more experience, omitting these variables from the analysis may 
bias the estimates produced by regression. Since the size of the difference in age and 
years of experience between the two groups is so large, this bias could potentially be 
quite large. In addition, non-tenured teachers in the sample are, on average, just over two 
years away from earning tenure while tenured teachers have, on average, had tenure for 
approximately 9.67 years. As with age, if there are unmeasured differences between 
teachers who have recently earned tenure and those who have had it for a longer period of 
time, the characteristics of tenured teachers in the sample may not be very similar to 
those of non-tenured teachers, even after controlling for those traits for which I do have 
data. Beyond differences in age and experience, non- tenured teachers in this sample are 
more likely to be Hispanic or black, are less likely to have majored in the subject they 
teach (though more likely to have minored in it), and teach a given class for more total 
minutes each week. Finally, non-tenured teachers are more likely to have their teaching 
observed, and observed regularly, by school administration, which could explain why 
teachers without tenure might perform better than those with it.  
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The data from Table 4 suggests that tenured teachers are significantly more likely 
to have students with higher levels of socioeconomic status (income level and parents’ 
education levels), higher eighth grade test scores, and students who are white. These 
characteristics are often associated with higher-performing students and schools. The 
simple difference in sample means also indicates that students of tenured teachers see 
larger test score gains between eighth and tenth grade. Teachers without tenure, on the 
other hand, appear to be associated with students that are limited English proficient (LEP) 
and students that are Hispanic or black, all of which are traits of students and schools that 
are on the lower end of the achievement distribution.  
  
Regression Analysis  
Column (1) of Table 5 shows the most naïve estimate of the effect of tenure, 
which is a simple regression of tenure status on student gain scores, controlling for 
subject. The coefficient on tenure, 0.159, means that, on average, students with tenured 
teachers get an additional 0.159 questions right, from eighth to tenth grade, than students 
without tenured teachers. Table 3 shows that there is a significant correlation between 
tenure and experience, so careful separation of the two variables is necessary in order to 
more precisely estimate the true effect of tenure on teacher performance. By neglecting to 
control for the effect of experience, this initial estimate of the coefficient on tenure very 
likely suffers from significant omitted variable bias.  
Adding variables for experience level to the model may alleviate this bias and 
more accurately measure the effect of tenure. Much literature in the field of education 
recognizes that the relationship between experience and student performance is likely to  
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have a non-linear relationship. For this reason many researchers, such as Aaronson et al. 
(2007) and Rockoff (2004), include quadratic or cubic functions of experience in their 
models. I will follow suit in my analysis and include experience, experience-squared, and 
experience-cubed.  In this paper, I measure a teacher’s experience at his or her current 
school relative to when the teacher earns tenure. Measuring experience relative to tenure 
provides additional insight into the effect of experience by directly comparing teachers 
with the same level of experience but different a tenure status due to the tenure law for 
the state in which a teacher is employed. I can then narrow in on the change in teacher 
performance that occurs just after earning tenure. A value of negative one for this 
experience variable indicates that the teacher will have tenure beginning the following 
year, a value of zero indicates that a teacher is in his or her first year of tenure, a value of 
one indicates that the teacher is in his or her second year with tenure, and so forth. I can 
now estimate tenure again and take the effect of experience into account by regressing 
tenure status, experience, experience-squared, and experience-cubed on student test score 
gains, while controlling for subject. This results again in an estimate of the effect of 
tenure that is not significant. The coefficient on tenure, as seen in column (2) of Table 5, 
is approximately 0.0776, which means that, after controlling for experience and subject, 
students whose teachers have tenure answer approximately 0.0776 questions correctly in 
tenth grade than students whose teachers do not have tenure. In addition, the three 
measures of teacher experience relative to earning tenure (linear, quadratic, and cubic 
terms) are not significantly associated with improvements in student test scores.   
While the last estimate should bring us closer to the true effect of tenure on 
student performance, there may still be other important variables omitted from the  
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analysis. The summary statistics from Table 4 show that tenured teachers are 
significantly more likely to have students with higher eighth grade test scores, suggesting 
that student assignment to teachers may not be random and instead that factors such as 
student aptitude may be taken into account when assigning students to teachers and 
classes. These students may be more likely to improve their scores or, instead, perhaps 
they have already scored at such a high level that there is simply little room to improve 
compared to a student with a lower eighth grade score. By controlling for students’ base 
year test scores, the relationship between student aptitude and assignment to a tenured or 
non-tenured teacher as well as the potential ceiling effect of test scores can be assessed in 
order to more precisely estimate the effect of tenure.  Indeed, a regression of tenure 
status, experience variables, and eighth grade scores on gain scores, holding subject 
constant, results in a new estimate of the effect of tenure. This new coefficient shown in 
column (3) of Table 5 is 0.077, which is approximately the same value as the previous 
regression. As before, it is not significant. Although an improvement of one point of an 
eighth grade score is significantly associated with a decrease in gain scores by 
approximately 0.03 points, the unchanged estimate of the tenure effect indicates that a 
student’s base year score is not confounded with tenure and gain scores. However, it may 
still be an important measure to control for because it can be related to other student 
characteristics that are associated with gain scores or having a teacher with tenure. 
Although these three regressions allowed me to begin to narrow in on the true 
effect of tenure, I know from the statistics in Tables 3 and 4 that the tenured and non- 
tenured teachers still differ in many ways, and I must use regression analysis in order to 
control for student, school, and teacher characteristics that may be associated with  
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whether a teacher has tenure or that may affect student test scores. For example, Table 4 
shows that students of higher socioeconomic status are more likely to have a tenured 
teacher. If students with these characteristics are also more likely to earn higher test 
scores, then socioeconomic status must be controlled for in my analysis. Similarly, as 
noted previously in this paper, characteristics such as gender, race, or ethnicity can be 
related to test scores. Controlling for characteristic differences of students and teachers 
according to tenure status and for potential confounding factors as well as subject, I again 
estimate the effect of tenure on student gain scores. The results are shown in column (4) 
of Table 5. The estimate of the coefficient on tenure reveals that holding all other 
variables constant, a student with a tenured teacher has a 0.12 greater test score gain than 
a student without a tenured teacher, with a standard error of approximately 0.26.  With a 
t-statistic of 0.48 (p=0.631), this estimate is not significant despite its increase in 
magnitude from the estimate in column (3), and I cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
there is no effect of tenure on student test score gains. The positive sign of the coefficient 
suggests an overall positive effect of tenure on student achievement. However, the 
magnitude of this effect is relatively small – approximately 2.1% of a standard deviation 
of the sample distribution of student gain scores (5.816). Even if this were the true effect 
of tenure, its size is negligible, and, with a 95% confidence interval of the estimate that 
ranges from -0.38 to 0.63, does not provide convincing evidence that tenure has an effect, 
in any direction, on student performance.  
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Results By Subject 
The effect of teacher characteristics on student performance may vary according 
to subject. In addition, the subject tests administered as part of NELS:88 vary in the total 
number of questions, so the meaning of a test score will also vary according to the 
subject. For these two reasons, dummy variables for each of the four school subjects are 
not sufficient for this analysis. Instead, I ran a separate regression for each subject. 
Estimates of the coefficients from each of these regressions appear in Table 6.  
As seen in Table 6, each estimate has a magnitude lower than 0.3 and none are 
significantly significant. The coefficients on tenure for history and math teachers are 
positive but for science and English teachers are negative. The effects of teacher 
characteristics on student performance tend to be more alike for math and science than 
for other subjects, as is the case with variables such as experience (Rockoff, 2004) or 
educational history (Wayne and Youngs, 2003). Here, however, I do not find the effect of 
tenure to even be in the same direction for math and science. While tenure experience 
may, in reality, have opposite effects on teacher performance in these two subjects, given 
the small size of these effects and the relatively large standard errors, it is more likely that 
the findings provide further evidence that there is no effect of tenure.   
 
Results Using Eighth Grade Teacher Characteristics 
The change in a student’s test scores from eighth to tenth grade is a function of 
the impact of both the tenth grade teacher and the ninth grade teacher. Furthermore, 
because students in the sample were tested in eighth grade between February and June, an 
eighth grade teacher may have continued to improve a student’s achievement in the  
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remaining months of school after the testing date. Although the NELS:88 data does not 
include information on the characteristics of ninth grade teachers, it does have sufficient 
information on eighth grade teachers such that I can include measures of eighth grade 
teacher tenure status and experience in my model. Adding these variables should make 
the estimates of teacher effects more precise by better identifying how much of a 
student’s test score change can be attributed to the tenth grade teacher versus the eighth 
grade teacher. Not all student data is matched to teachers of the same subjects for both 
eighth and tenth grade, so the number of observations in the sample of student test scores 
in subjects with teacher data dropped from 12,779 to 10,546 with the inclusion of eighth 
grade teacher characteristics.  
Table 7 shows estimates from a regression model that includes variables for 
eighth grade teacher tenure status and experience. Column (1) displays the results from a 
regression with subject dummy variables and the following four columns display the 
results of subject-specific regressions. There are no general patterns of change in the 
magnitude and direction of the estimates of the effect of tenure and experience from those 
presented in Table 5, column (4) or Table 6 to those in Table 7. However, including 
eighth grade teacher characteristics does result in estimates that suggest a significant 
negative effect of tenure for eighth grade history teachers and a significant positive effect 
of tenure for tenth grade English teachers. These differences are interesting because they 
are a change in both magnitude and direction from estimates of the effect of tenure status 
for tenth grade teachers in the same subject, but because there seems to be no pattern of 
changes for all estimates after adding the eighth grade teacher characteristics, the new  
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estimates do not provide convincing evidence in support of tenure having a significant 
effect on teacher performance. 
  
Results for “New” Teachers 
Considering the many differences between teachers with and without tenure 
(Table 3), it is quite feasible that there are several other unobserved factors that are 
associated with tenure status and that, if omitted, may bias estimates of the effect of 
tenure. The most striking difference in a measured teacher characteristic is that of 
experience. On average, teachers with tenure have been teaching at their current schools 
for over eleven years longer than their non-tenured counterparts. If there are confounding 
variables associated with teacher experience and performance, their omission may bias 
my results, especially because the difference in experience is so large. Furthermore, there 
are no teachers in my sample with greater than six years of experience but have not 
earned tenure, meaning that there is no variation in tenure status at higher levels of 
experience. To address the concerns that even after controlling for teaching experience 
there may still be unobserved confounding variables associated with experience, I re-
estimated the effects of tenure dropping teachers with greater than ten, and then five, 
years of experience after earning tenure status. Arguably, this creates groups that are 
more similar to one another and may thus narrow in on the effect of being granted tenure 
on changes in performance in the short-run. As seen in Table 8, estimates of the 
coefficient on tenure display a pattern as the sample of teacher changes from those with 
fewer than twenty-two years of experience relative to tenure, to those with ten or fewer, 
and finally to those with five or fewer. For the entire sample as well as each of the four  
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subjects, the coefficient becomes more negative as the sample of teachers with tenure 
becomes smaller. The pattern is certainly noteworthy and it is tempting to draw some 
kind of conclusion from it. However, none of the coefficients become significant, and the 
size of each estimate is still small compared to the standard deviation of the sample 
distribution of gain scores. Also, each of the coefficients from all regressions using 
smaller groups of teachers according to experience level fall within the 95% confidence 
interval for the estimate of the tenure effect resulting from the complete sample. These 
findings appear to suggest that by limiting the analysis to teachers with lower levels of 
experience, the groups of tenured and non-tenured teachers become more similar to each 
other. The changes in the estimates of the effect of tenure may be explained by a 
reduction in bias that results from omitting variables associated with more experience or 
older teachers.  
  
Discussion   
Taken at face value, the results of this paper suggest that tenure status has no 
effect on teacher quality. To evaluate what this means about the effectiveness of tenure 
policies, it is important to recognize that there are different goals associated with tenure 
policies and that some schools, school districts, or states may be interested in only one of 
them. If, for example, the aim is to give teachers job security and fair treatment with 
regard to firing policies, then tenure may be effective at achieving it; my research does 
not address this. If the rationale behind tenure goes a step further and intends for job 
security to provide an incentive for high quality teaching, I do not see evidence that 
earning tenure improves teacher performance. If tenure policies appropriately filter out  
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the lower quality teachers in their first few years, meaning that they are fired before 
earning tenure, I would expect to see a positive effect of earning tenure since the group of 
teacher with tenure should consist of only good teachers. I did not find such an effect, 
which prompts the question of whether tenure truly provides job security to those 
teachers that have earned it as a result of high performance in the classroom. According 
to a Hoover Institution report, school districts in the US, on average, dismiss about one 
teacher per year for poor performance (Hess, 2003). If true, this statistic suggests that 
many lower quality teachers do not get cut from the system can eventually earn tenure, 
thus providing a possible explanation for my finding that tenure has no effect on teacher 
performance, since the mix of good and bad teachers by tenure status should be similar. 
However, this statistic may be misleading. Teachers are not necessarily “fired” for poor 
performance. School administrators may pressure a teacher to resign or retire, or the 
teacher’s contract may simply not be renewed during his or her probationary period. 
Depending on how districts define “firing” and report the figures, the low rate of teacher 
firings may not tell us much about whether job security already exists de facto for 
teachers without tenure since dismissal is so rare, or if tenure is the only true way for a 
teacher to obtain job security. In the case that tenure does not provide meaningful 
incentives for teacher improvement, any change in performance as a result of earning 
tenure would be a function of some other variable correlated with tenure status. 
  That the effect of tenure on teacher performance changes when I limit the analysis 
to teachers with younger levels of experience draws attention to a general problem with 
trying to assess tenure policies.  Tenure is based on years of experience, and teachers who 
do not earn tenure are usually not rehired to their current school and must seek  
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employment elsewhere. Full-time teachers with over five years of experience at their 
current school most likely have tenure. Those with ten or fifteen years almost certainly 
do. I am therefore unable to observe the teaching quality of teachers that have high levels 
of experience but no tenure and compare them to teachers that have the same level of 
experience and also tenure. Since there may be an effect of experience on performance, it 
is impossible to completely separate this effect from that of tenure for more experienced 
teachers and thus to estimate the true effect of tenure across the whole experience 
distribution.  
Along these lines, an important focus in my research design was to untangle the 
effects of tenure and teacher experience on teacher quality. Aaronson et al. (2007) did 
consider tenure in their study on teacher performance and also found no effect, but used a 
flawed experience measure. My analysis uses true levels of experience at a teacher’s 
current school, but was subject to limitations of the NELS:88 data. Although the data 
does report the precise number of years of experience that a teacher has in his or her 
current school, data on a teacher’s total number of years of experience is missing for 
many teachers in the sample. Experience is too important a factor to impute the missing 
data, so the variable was not included in the analysis. However, of those teachers for 
whom I had data on both current school experience and total experience, the values of the 
two variables were only the same for about thirty-five percent of the teachers. This 
suggests that many teachers have prior experience, perhaps during which time the return 
in effectiveness for an additional year of experience has already leveled off. Still, the 
motivation to earn tenure at a new school may affect performance during the 
probationary period and the incentive to continue teaching at high levels may alter once  
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job security is obtained. While the estimated effect of experience on performance in my 
analysis may be diminished somewhat as a result of missing data, I suspect that the 
significance of the effect of tenure might not be altered if complete information on 
teacher experience were included in the regression model. 
Another methodological concern is that a teacher’s tenure status was inferred 
based on state laws and current school experience. Aaronson et al. (2007) used a similar 
method by comparing a teacher’s potential experience to the Illinois tenure law and 
inferring tenure. While the method used in this research is in line with previous literature, 
there are always exceptions to the rule. For example, a teacher that switches to a new 
school in the same state or district may, depending on the state’s law, have a shorter or 
even non-existent probationary period before earning tenure than that which a new 
teacher would have. A dataset that has specific information on a teacher’s employment 
history would permit more accurate measures of tenure status and therefore more precise 
estimates of the effect of tenure on teacher performance.  
There are several other variables that might be effective controls for this analysis 
but that were either not included in this analysis but would be useful for future research. 
For example, knowing the range of salaries for full-time teachers in a given school might 
be a useful variable. Not only do wage ranges provide information on incentives available 
to teachers, but also younger teachers with potential for larger raises in the future may 
perform at a higher level than teachers who expect smaller raises over time. Similarly, 
tenured teachers and those with greater experience at the school are likely to receive 
salaries near the high end of the range of wages and therefore not have much more room 
to increase wages, which could reduce the effect of the incentive to improve teaching  
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quality. Unfortunately, for too many schools in my sample (well over 20%) there was no 
data on salary range and imputing a value of the variable for so large a group of the 
sample would likely pose threats to the validity of my analysis.  
  
Conclusions  
This analysis suggests that teacher tenure does not have an effect on teacher 
performance, as measured by student test score gains. Even if we accept the point 
estimates, the magnitudes of the estimates are too small a percent of the standard 
deviation of the gain scores sample distribution for tenure to have a truly meaningful 
impact on student achievement.  
With so much recent attention on how education policies can be used to improve 
teacher quality, it is important to research and understand the effects of policies, such as 
teacher tenure, that may affect teacher performance. Because these findings suggest that 
tenure does not impact teacher quality, the goals of a tenure program should be 
reevaluated. If tenure policies are meant simply to provide job security and protection for 
teachers, without affecting their performance, then it may be doing its job. However, if 
job security is meant to provide an incentive for teachers to improve by giving them the 
freedom to try more creative teaching styles or, this paper does not find evidence of such 
an effect.  
There may be additional costs and benefits of tenure policies that are not 
identified in my analysis but that may help explain the impact of tenure on teachers, 
students, and schools. If the cost to school districts to fire a tenured teacher is too large, 
then tenure policies may prevent schools from firing poorly performing teachers. For  
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example, a school may decide that it is not worth the time or legal fees to argue for the 
dismissal of a tenured teacher in front of a state tenure board and would choose to retain 
poorly performing teachers, possibly giving them easier classes or students to teach in 
order to minimize the negative effects of their low quality teaching. On the other hand, 
school boards may grant tenure as a substitute for wage increases for teachers of higher 
quality or more experience. Seen in this light, tenure as an alternative to higher pay may 
make available more of a school’s budget for school resources or programs. A cost-
benefit analysis may reveal the magnitude of costs and benefits associated with tenure 
policies and thus allow for a more thorough evaluation of the impact of the policies.  
With policymakers continuously examining how best to improve public education 
and teacher quality, research on teacher tenure is highly relevant. Tenure policies have 
long been implemented throughout the country, yet little is known about their impact on 
teacher performance. The results of this paper highlight the need for further research and 
consideration of a policy that has, for a century, has been a seldom-questioned status quo.    
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Data Appendix 1: Notes on State Tenure Policies 
1.  For each state, I first located the tenure policy in the current state statutes or code. I 
then conducted Lexis Nexis State Capital searches on the terms “Teacher AND 
tenure”, “Teacher AND contract”, and the state code number (to check for any 
legislation citing or amending it) for each year from 1991 to 2009 in order to 
determine if there had been any policy change regarding the number of years required 
to obtain tenure. I checked for news reports if I found a policy change and compared 
my findings to data on tenure laws from 1971 and 2007 as listed in reports by the 
National Education Association and the Education Commission of the States. 
2.  For several states, there was either no statewide or specified policy regarding tenure 
in 1990. 
a.  Arkansas: Teachers receive tenure, and with it due process rights, after a three 
year probationary period. However, they are not granted an automatically 
renewing contract for an indefinite period of time. Instead contracts are 
limited to three-year time periods. I will determine that obtaining due process 
rights is the point at which tenure may change a teacher’s perception of job 
stability and thus potentially alter a teacher’s incentives. I will define the 
tenure law for Arkansas as three years. 
b.  Mississippi, North Dakota, Vermont: None of these states had laws regarding 
tenure in 1990, but all provided tenure-like rights to teachers in their first year 
of teaching. I will therefore define the tenure law for each of these three states 
as one year. 
c.  Wisconsin: In 1990, tenure protection existed for teachers who obtained 
tenure in cities with a population over 150,000 (after three years of 
consecutive service) and in counties with a population over 500,000 (after 
three years of consecutive service with a contract renewal for a fourth year). 
Contract renewal for all other teachers was based on collective bargaining 
procedures. Because it is near impossible to know which schools had which 
policy in 1990 and because the majority of my sample of Wisconsin 
observations comes from the more populated areas with specific tenure laws, I 
will define the tenure law for Wisconsin as three years.  
33 
 
Data Appendix 2: Notes on Variable Creation 
For number-range categorical variables:  
•  If there were at least five categories, for each category, the average of the range 
(ex: 75 If the range is 50 to 100) were used as each unit’s output for that variable 
•  For an un-bounded maximum-level category (example: income of $200,000 or 
more), I used the minimum boundary for the category (ex: $200,000). 
•  This method was used for family income, teacher age (by year of birth), minutes 
of class or lab time per week, school size, percent of students in a school 
receiving free or reduced price lunch, percent of students in a school that are not 
White. 
o  All other variables used except for student test scores, teacher experience, 
and tenure status, are categorical dummy variables 
 
For missing variables: 
•  If an observation was missing data for a categorical variable (such as race, gender, 
etc.), the observation was given a value of 0 for the variable and a value of 1 for a 
dummy variable indicating missing data (ex: male=0 and mis_male=1), 
•  For non-categorical variables, observations with missing data for a given variable 
received the mean value of the variable for all observations with reported data. 
Dummies indicating missing data for each of these variables were included in the 
regression model. 
 
Measuring Tenure Status and Experience 
•  A variable indicating the length of the probationary period for each teacher’s state 
of employment was generated. The values of this variable ranged from one to 
five. 
•  A variable was generated for a teacher’s years of experience at the current school 
of employment relative to earning tenure by subtracting from the teacher’s current 
school experience the length of the probationary period plus one year.  
o  Ex: a teacher in his or her fourth year, in a state that grants tenure after 
three consecutive years of employment will have a value for this 
experience level equal to “0,” indicating that the teacher is in his or her 
first year with tenure. 
•  A variable for tenure status was generated by assigning “1” to all teachers for 
whom their current school experience relative to tenure was greater than or equal 
to zero. 
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Figure 1: Tenure Laws By State 
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Figure 2: Scatterplot of Total Experience versus Potential Experience for Eighth Grade 
Math Teachers, with Fitted Values 
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Table 1: Stata Output for Regression of Total Experience on Potential Experience for 
Eighth Grade Math Teachers 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: T-Test of the Difference Between Potential Experience and Total Experience for 
Eighth Grade Math Teachers  
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Table 3: Teacher Summary Statistics 
 
Variable  Whole Sample 
 
Tenure  No 
Tenure 
Difference 
Male***  0.4854 
(0.0063) 
n=6300 
0.5064 
(0.0071) 
0.4048 
(0.0135) 
0.0997 
(0.1538) 
Female***  0.515 (0.006) 
n=6300 
0.4936 
(0.0071) 
0.5932 
(0.0135) 
 -0.0997 
(0.1538) 
American Indian  0.0041 
(0.0008) 
n=6287 
0.0042 
(0.0009) 
0.0038 
(0.0017) 
0.0004 
(0.0020) 
Asian or Pacific Islander  0.0099 
(0.001) 
n=6287 
0.0107 
(0.0015) 
0.0068 
(0.0023) 
0.0039 
(0.0031) 
Hispanic***  0.0253 
(0.0029) 
n=6287 
0.0224 
(0.0021) 
0.0361 
(0.0051) 
 -0.0138 
(0.0048) 
Black**  0.0121 
(0.0014) 
n=6287 
0.0105 
(0.0014) 
0.0182 
(0.0037) 
 -0.0076 
(0.0034) 
White  0.9019 
(0.0014) 
n=6287 
0.9034 
(0.0042) 
0.8961 
(0.0084) 
0.0073 
(0.0034) 
Age***  42.6740 
(0.1121) 
n=6154 
44.3042 
(0.1200) 
36.6402 
(0.2123) 
7.6640 
(0.2559) 
Total Years of Teaching 
Experience*** 
15.7622 
(0.1430) 
n=4718 
18.1601 
(0.1504) 
7.4670 
(0.2283) 
10.6931 
(0.3055) 
Number of Years Teaching at 
Current School*** 
10.9570 
(0.1038) 
n=6325 
13.3899 
(0.1079) 
1.8720 
(0.0252) 
11.5179 
(0.2089) 
Years of Experience Relative to 
Earning Tenure*** 
7.1943 
(0.1045) 
n=6325 
9.6705 
(0.1081) 
 -2.0524 
(0.0247) 
11.7229 
(0.2093) 
Years of Education  15.8570 
(0.0211) 
n=6308 
15.8436 
(0.0247) 
15.9070 
(0.0388) 
 -0.0634 
(0.0517) 
Teaches Subject of College 
Major*** 
0.7201 
(0.0062) 
n=5169 
0.7295 
(0.0070) 
0.6852 
(0.0140) 
0.0443 
(0.0153) 
Teaches Subject of College 
Minor** 
0.3442 
(0.0075) 
n=3972 
0.3362 
(0.0084) 
0.3750 
(0.0170) 
 -0.0388 
(0.0187) 
Teaches Subject of Graduate 
Degree 
0.4380 
(0.0084) 
n=3475 
0.4365 
(0.0092) 
0.4456 
(0.0208) 
0.0091 
(0.0227) 
Never Observed by 
Administrator Last 
Semester*** 
0.2860 
(0.0062) 
n=5392 
0.3311 
(0.0072) 
0.1152 
(0.0095) 
0.2159 
(0.0148) 
Observed by Administrator 
Once Last Semester*** 
0.03724 
(0.0066) 
n=5392 
0.3949 
(0.0075) 
0.2872 
(0.0135) 
0.1077 
(0.0161) 
Observed by Administrator 2 to 
3 Times last Semester*** 
0.3203 
(0.0064) 
n=5392 
0.2589 
(0.0067)  
0.5523 
(0.0148) 
 -0.02934 
(0.0151)  
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Observed by Administrator at 
least Once per Month Last 
Semester*** 
0.0182 
(0.0018) 
n=5392 
0.0127 
(0.0017) 
0.0390 
(0.0058) 
 -0.0263 
(0.0045) 
Observed by Administrator at 
Least Once per Week Last 
Semester** 
0.0032 
(0.0008) 
n=5392 
0.0023 
(0.0007) 
0.0062 
(0.0023) 
 -0.0039 
(0.0019) 
Minutes of Class per Week**  235.0819 
(0.8591) 
n=6092 
233.9939 
(0.9803) 
239.0949 
(1.7711) 
 -5.1010 
(2.0964) 
Weekly Minutes of Lab Time per 
Week 
20.9539 
(0.5909) 
n=5945 
21.3196 
(0.6819) 
19.6130 
(1.1631) 
1.7066 
(1.4401) 
Class Size  24.0018 
(0.0922) 
n=6048 
24.0446 
(0.1037) 
23.8418 
(0.2015) 
0.2029 
(0.2259) 
*significant at 10%;** significant at 5%;*** significant at 1%  
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Table 4: Student Summary Statistics 
 
Variable 
Whole 
Sample  Tenure 
No 
Tenure  Difference 
Male  0.477 
(0.004) 
n=14741 
0.475 (0.005)  0.483 
(0.009) 
 -0.008 
(0.010) 
Female  0.524 
(0.004) 
n=14741 
0.525 (0.005)   0.517 
(0.009) 
0.008 
(0.010) 
American Indian***  0.042 
(0.002) 
n=11760 
0.039 (0.002)  0.053 
(0.004) 
 -0.013 
(0.004) 
Asian or Pacific 
Islander*** 
0.067 
(0.002) 
n=11760 
0.073 (0.002)  0.045 
(0.004) 
0.028 
(0.005) 
Hispanic***  0.115 
(0.003) 
n=11760 
0.109 (0.003)  00.141 
(0.006)  
 -0.032 
(0.007) 
Black***  0.098 
(0.003) 
n=11760 
0.0910 (0.003)  0.128 
(0.006) 
 -0.037 
(0.006) 
White***  0.673 
(0.004) 
n=11760 
0.684 (0.004)  0.631 
(0.009) 
 -0.053 
(0.010) 
Language Other than 
English Spoken at 
Home 
0.446 
(0.009) 
n=2945 
0.449 (0.010)  0.433 
(0.020) 
0.016 
(0.023) 
Limited English 
Porficient (LEP)** 
0.012 
(0.001) 
n=14441 
0.011 (0.001)  0.016 
(0.002) 
 -0.006 
(0.002) 
Learning Disability  0.062 
(0.002) 
n=14074 
0.060 (0.002)  0.066 
(0.005) 
 -0.005 
(0.005) 
Family Size  4.633 
(0.012) 
n=14722  
4.625 (0.013)  4.662 
(0.027) 
 -0.036 
(0.029) 
Family Income***  36488.15 
(243.075) 
n=13844 
33949.000(519.876)  37135.950 
(274.421) 
3186.942 
(603.435) 
Father Years of 
Education*** 
13.458 
(0.024) 
n=12521 
13.549 (0.027)  13.094 
(0.050) 
0.455 
(0.060) 
Mother Years of 
Education*** 
13.168 
(0.021) 
n=13091 
13.220 (0.024)  12.963 
(0.005) 
0.257 
(0.053) 
8
th Grade Test 
Score*** 
28.002 
(0.086) 
n=14817 
28.261 (0.097)  26.984 
(0.182) 
1.277 
(0.212) 
Test Score Gain (8
th 
Grade to 10
th Grade)* 
4.134 
(0.048) 
n=14817 
4.177 (0.054)  3.965 
(0.105) 
0.212 
(0.119) 
*significant at 10%;** significant at 5%;*** significant at 1%  
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Table 5: Regression Analysis 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Tenure  0.159  0.078  0.077  0.124 
   (0.133)  (0.264)  (0.264)  (0.259) 
Subject Dummies          
English  0.770  0.768  1.050  1.531 
   (0.129)***  (0.129)***  (0.138)***  (0.169)*** 
History  -0.429  -0.430  -0.063  0.531 
   (0.156)***  (0.156)***  (0.168)  (0.189)*** 
Math  4.853  4.853  5.467  6.718 
   (0.136)***  (0.136)***  (0.172)***  (0.195)*** 
Teacher Characteristics           
Tenure Exp    0.022  0.028  -0.025 
     (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.063) 
Tenure Exp-squared    -0.002  -0.002  0.002 
     (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Tenure Exp-cubed    0.000  0.000  0.000 
     (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Male        -0.361 
         (0.105)*** 
Hispanic        -0.390 
         (0.454) 
Black        0.056 
         (0.669) 
Other non-White        -0.291 
         (0.470) 
Age        0.001 
         (0.007) 
Associates Degree        0.482 
         (0.423) 
Bachelors Degree        0.019 
         (0.126) 
Education Degree or         0.015 
 Certification        (0.212) 
Masters Degree        0.314 
         (0.139)** 
Doctorate Degree        0.141 
         (0.464) 
Professional Degree        -1.641 
         (0.664)** 
Teach Subject of Major        0.564 
         (0.134)*** 
Teach Subject of Minor        0.351 
         (0.139)** 
Teach Subject of Graduate        0.008 
 Degree        (0.124) 
Observed Once        -0.081 
         (0.120) 
Observed 2 to 3 Times        -0.213 
         (0.136) 
Observed Monthly        -0.239 
         (0.381) 
Observed Weekly        -1.383 
            (1.049) 
Student Characteristics          
Eighth Grade Test Score      -0.034  -0.112 
       (0.006)***  (0.006)*** 
Male        0.355  
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         (0.095)*** 
Asian or Pacific Islander        0.555 
         (0.229)** 
Hispanic        -0.627 
         (0.207)*** 
Black        -1.210 
         (0.184)*** 
American Indian        -0.531 
         (0.245)** 
Speak English at Home        -0.021 
         (0.220) 
Family Income        0.000 
         (0.000)   . 
Family Size        0.005 
         (0.035) 
Father HS Diploma        0.525 
         (0.163)*** 
Father Some College        0.932 
         (0.185)*** 
Father at Least College Degree        1.014 
         (0.195)*** 
Mother HS Diploma        0.326 
         (0.159)** 
Mother Some College        0.703 
         (0.183)*** 
Mother at least College Degree        0.677 
         (0.199)*** 
Absent from Class Most or        -1.290 
 All of the Time        (0.293)*** 
Absent Some of Time        -0.622 
         (0.112)*** 
Attentive in Class Most or         1.686 
 All of the Time        (0.207)*** 
Attentive Some of Time        0.756 
         (0.218)*** 
Limited English Proficient         -0.246 
         (0.453) 
Learning Disability        -2.443 
            (0.206)*** 
School and Class Characteristics          
School Size        0.000 
         (0.000)*** 
Percent of Students Receiving        -0.004 
 Free Lunch        (0.003) 
Percent of Non-White Students        0.004 
         (0.003) 
Minnutes of Class Time per        0.000 
 Week        (0.001) 
Minutes of Lab Time per        -0.002 
 Week        (0.001) 
Class Size        0.012 
         (0.006)** 
Constant  2.534  2.573  3.180  3.294 
   (0.151)***  (0.191)***  (0.217)***  (1.108)*** 
Observations  12779  12779  12779  12779 
R-squared  0.128  0.128  0.130  0.195 
Standard errors in parentheses;*significant at 10%;** significant at 5%;*** significant at 1% 
Note: Regressions included dummy variables for the state in which a teacher is employed; 
also dummies for observations with missing data for each variable used in a regression. 
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Table 6: Regression Analysis by Subject 
   English  History  Math  Science 
Tenure  -0.006  0.294  0.250  -0.224 
   (0.493)  (0.462)  (0.630)  (0.403) 
Teacher Characteristics             
Tenure Exp  -0.080  -0.064  0.079  0.064 
   (0.122)  (0.112)  (0.157)  (0.097) 
Tenure Exp-squared  0.014  0.001  -0.010  -0.015 
  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.019)  (0.012) 
Tenure Exp-cubed  -0.001  0.000  0.000  0.001 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Male  -0.270  -0.073  -0.537  -0.086 
   (0.207)  (0.181)  (0.248)**  (0.162) 
Hispanic  -0.595  -0.073  1.246  -1.484 
   (0.881)  (1.706)  (1.017)  (0.599)** 
Black  -0.169  0.261  -1.308  0.951 
   (1.209)  (1.842)  (1.626)  (1.060) 
Other non-White  -0.080  -0.471  -0.333  -1.029 
   (1.075)  (0.945)  (0.974)  (0.666) 
Age  0.007  0.022  -0.015  0.010 
   (0.013)  (0.013)*  (0.018)  (0.011) 
Associates Degree  0.731  1.307  0.207  -0.711 
   (0.748)  (0.859)  (1.090)  (0.595) 
Bachelors Degree  0.145  0.032  0.196  -0.057 
   (0.240)  (0.213)  (0.313)  (0.200) 
Education Degree or   -0.073  0.328  -0.567  0.498 
 Certification  (0.386)  (0.338)  (0.507)  (0.382) 
Masters Degree  0.303  -0.182  0.681  0.276 
   (0.259)  (0.224)  (0.354)*  (0.226) 
Doctorate Degree  0.016  0.845  0.641  0.491 
   (0.840)  (0.843)  (1.428)  (0.610) 
Professional Degree  -1.093  0.118  -5.109  -1.279 
   (1.373)  (0.817)  (2.355)**  (1.034) 
Teach Subject of Major  0.728  0.696  0.990  0.193 
   (0.319)**  (0.259)***  (0.373)***  (0.183) 
Teach Subject of Minor  1.027  0.131  0.525  0.123 
   (0.358)***  (0.228)  (0.418)  (0.172) 
Teach Subject of Graduate  -0.269  0.218  0.240  0.012 
 Degree  (0.237)  (0.208)  (0.314)  (0.191) 
Observed Once  0.061  -0.022  -0.194  0.034 
   (0.228)  (0.220)  (0.281)  (0.194) 
Observed 2 to 3 Times  -0.177  -0.294  0.095  -0.445 
   (0.253)  (0.240)  (0.334)  (0.217)** 
Observed Monthly  0.416  0.144  -0.373  -0.843 
   (0.789)  (0.706)  (0.980)  (0.511)* 
Observed Weekly  -0.575  -3.643  -4.990  1.465 
   (2.840)  (2.083)*  (2.197)**  (1.327) 
Student Characteristics             
Eighth Grade Test Score  -0.155  -0.266  -0.076  -0.257 
   (0.012)***  (0.019)***  (0.011)***  (0.017)*** 
Male  0.066  0.440  0.093  1.024 
   (0.178)  (0.156)***  (0.227)  (0.146)*** 
Asian or Pacific Islander  0.275  1.259  0.531  0.314 
   (0.412)  (0.394)***  (0.527)  (0.354) 
Hispanic  -1.073  -0.232  -0.447  -1.002 
   (0.382)***  (0.350)  (0.490)  (0.318)***  
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Black  -0.914  -0.661  -1.899  -1.714 
   (0.339)***  (0.3024)**  (0.462)***  (0.268)*** 
American Indian  -0.721  -0.160  -1.114  -0.403 
   (0.463)  (0.379)  (0.6084)*  (0.365) 
Speak English at Home  0.282  0.093  -0.239  0.220 
   (0.398)  (0.386)  (0.527)  (0.336) 
Family Income  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   (0.000)   .  (0.000)   .  (0.000)   .  (0.000)*** 
Family Size  -0.095  -0.007  0.109  -0.036 
   (0.064)  (0.059)  (0.084)  (0.054) 
Father HS Diploma  0.423  0.406  1.054  0.171 
   (0.299)  (0.272)  (0.385)***  (0.249) 
Father Some College  1.060  0.624  1.549  0.297 
   (0.340)***  (0.307)**  (0.435)***  (0.282) 
Father at Least College Degree  1.139  0.749  1.391  0.791 
   (0.363)***  (0.321)**  (0.464)***  (0.296)*** 
Mother HS Diploma  0.247  0.428  0.363  0.593 
   (0.291)  (0.269)  (0.382)  (0.2414)** 
Mother Some College  0.539  0.928  0.921  0.865 
   (0.336)  (0.300)***  (0.437)**  (0.278)*** 
Mother at least College Degree  0.572  1.051  1.040  0.540 
   (0.370)  (0.323)***  (0.478)**  (0.300)* 
Absent from Class Most or  -0.407  -0.574  -3.671  -0.783 
 All of the Time  (0.556)  (0.509)  (0.7368)***  (0.3992)** 
Absent Some of Time  -0.415  -0.495  -1.038  -0.715 
   (0.208)**  (0.188)***  (0.264)***  (0.173)*** 
Attentive in Class Most or   2.434  1.352  1.370  1.603 
 All of the Time  (0.387)***  (0.317)***  (0.527)***  (0.310)*** 
Attentive Some of Time  1.422  0.469  -0.021  1.092 
   (0.405)***  (0.340)  (0.551)  (0.326)*** 
Limited English Proficient   -1.122  -1.677  0.718  0.252 
   (0.816)  (0.832)**  (1.194)  (0.625) 
Learning Disability  -2.664  -1.217  -4.278  -1.612 
   (0.367)***  (0.342)***  (0.534)***  (0.318)*** 
School and Class Characteristics          
School Size  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   (0.000)**  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)* 
Percent of Students Receiving  -0.002  -0.005  -0.001  -0.009 
 Free Lunch  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.005)* 
Percent of Non-White Students  0.003  0.003  0.005  0.000 
   (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.004) 
Minutes of Class Time per  -0.001  0.000  0.000  0.002 
 Week  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Minutes of Lab Time per  0.000  0.002  -0.007  0.001 
 Week  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.004)*  (0.002) 
Class Size  0.023  0.007  0.048  0.003 
   (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.018)***  (0.011) 
Constant  1.035  6.130  10.488  4.802 
   (2.435)  (3.540)*  (6.804)  (1.624)*** 
Observations  4322  2025  3427  3005 
R-squared  0.097  0.197  0.122  0.177 
 
Standard errors in parentheses;*significant at 10%;** significant at 5%;*** significant at 1% 
Note: Regressions included dummy variables for the state in which a teacher is employed; 
also dummies for observations with missing data for each variable used in a regression. 
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Table 7: Regression Analysis with Eighth Grade Teacher Characteristics 
   (1)  English  History  Math  Science 
Subject Dummies            
English  -5.152          
   (0.155)***          
History  -6.172          
   (0.173)***          
Science  -6.583          
   (0.211)***          
8th Grade Teacher Characteristics             
Tenure  -0.078  0.126  -1.283  0.089  0.069 
   (0.255)  (0.521)  (0.467)***  (0.622)  (0.389) 
Tenure Exp  -0.024  -0.003  0.089  -0.003  -0.091 
   (0.046)  (0.099)  (0.080)  (0.109)  (0.072) 
Tenure Exp-squared  0.003  0.004  -0.006  0.005  0.002 
   (0.004)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.007) 
Tenure Exp-cubed  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
10th Grade Teacher Characteristics             
Tenure  0.435  1.378  0.454  0.147  -0.302 
   (0.284)  (0.595)**  (0.495)  (0.680)  (0.442) 
Tenure Exp  -0.044  -0.247  -0.077  0.112  0.071 
   (0.069)  (0.146)*  (0.120)  (0.171)  (0.105) 
Tenure Exp-squared  0.003  0.026  0.008  -0.012  -0.015 
   (0.008)  (0.018)  (0.014)  (0.021)  (0.013) 
Tenure Exp-cubed  0.000  -0.001  0.000  0.000  0.001 
   (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Male  -0.417  -0.432  0.003  -0.501  -0.053 
   (0.114)***  (0.250)*  (0.194)  (0.269)*  (0.176) 
Hispanic  -0.263  -0.317  -0.161  0.727  -1.537 
   (0.505)  (0.969)  (1.694)  (1.097)  (0.726)** 
Black  0.101  -0.204  0.584  -0.884  0.430 
   (0.748)  (1.362)  (1.883)  (1.687)  (1.322) 
Other non-White  -1.145  -0.354  -1.302  -1.609  -1.177 
   (0.554)**  (1.293)  (1.013)  (1.253)  (0.758) 
Age  -0.003  0.012  0.018  -0.026  0.012 
   (0.008)  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.019)  (0.012) 
Associates Degree  0.569  1.211  1.811  0.312  -0.805 
   (0.461)  (0.866)  (0.940)*  (1.161)  (0.651) 
Bachelors Degree  0.054  0.300  0.118  0.061  -0.043 
   (0.139)  (0.293)  (0.229)  (0.337)  (0.215) 
Education Degree or   -0.079  -0.417  0.294  -0.675  0.752 
 Certification  (0.240)  (0.481)  (0.361)  (0.568)  (0.433)* 
Masters Degree  0.335  0.214  -0.424  0.857  0.233 
   (0.153)**  (0.309)  (0.241)*  (0.385)**  (0.244) 
Doctorate Degree  0.017  -0.559  0.656  0.842  0.411 
   (0.490)  (0.951)  (0.925)  (1.502)  (0.627) 
Professional Degree  -1.714  -1.487  0.205  -5.327  -1.325 
   (0.683)**  (1.535)  (0.834)  (2.526)**  (1.064) 
Teach Subject of   0.440  0.578  0.355  0.781  0.189 
  Major  (0.145)***  (0.392)  (0.275)  (0.402)*  (0.197) 
Teach Subject of   0.370  1.100  0.080  0.635  0.064 
  Minor  (0.149)**  (0.437)**  (0.242)  (0.452)  (0.184) 
Teach Subject of   0.009  -0.295  0.373  0.239  -0.053 
 Graduate Degree  (0.136)  (0.286)  (0.226)*  (0.336)  (0.207) 
Observed Once  -0.041  0.197  0.140  -0.103  0.014 
   (0.132)  (0.278)  (0.238)  (0.309)  (0.211) 
Observed 2 to 3   -0.220  -0.060  -0.166  0.011  -0.394  
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   Times  (0.149)  (0.306)  (0.255)  (0.362)  (0.231)* 
Observed Monthly  -0.087  1.951  -0.010  -0.885  -0.771 
   (0.449)  (1.376)  (0.712)  (1.106)  (0.570) 
Observed Weekly  -1.269  -0.042  -2.671  -4.864  1.706 
   (1.064)  (2.865)  (2.435)  (2.204)**  (1.427) 
Student 
Characteristics                
Eighth Grade Test   -0.109  -0.157  -0.270  -0.069  -0.266 
   Score  (0.007)***  (0.014)***  (0.020)***  (0.012)***  (0.018)*** 
Male  0.419  0.169  0.438  0.226  1.005 
   (0.104)***  (0.212)  (0.164)***  (0.244)  (0.156)*** 
Asian or Pacific   0.625  0.720  1.321  0.194  0.306 
   Islander  (0.252)**  (0.503)  (0.423)***  (0.566)  (0.384) 
Hispanic  -0.567  -0.741  -0.086  -0.501  -1.213 
   (0.230)**  (0.465)  (0.380)  (0.534)  (0.349)*** 
Black  -1.242  -0.920  -0.687  -1.686  -1.838 
   (0.200)***  (0.407)**  (0.319)**  (0.489)***  (0.286)*** 
American Indian  -0.499  -0.434  -0.118  -1.339  -0.519 
   (0.267)*  (0.574)  (0.395)  (0.664)**  (0.378) 
Speak English at   0.061  0.169  0.406  -0.088  0.290 
  Home  (0.244)  (0.486)  (0.424)  (0.572)  (0.361) 
Family Income  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   (0.00)**  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.00)*** 
Family Size  0.012  -0.042  -0.013  0.049  -0.045 
   (0.039)  (0.077)  (0.063)  (0.091)  (0.058) 
Father HS Diploma  0.574  0.620  0.381  1.064  0.137 
   (0.177)***  (0.353)*  (0.290)  (0.412)***  (0.265) 
Father Some College  0.787  0.711  0.527  1.534  0.266 
   (0.202)***  (0.408)*  (0.323)  (0.467)***  (0.303) 
Father at Least   0.858  0.957  0.548  1.342  0.694 
   College Degree  (0.214)***  (0.435)**  (0.337)  (0.497)***  (0.319)** 
Mother HS Diploma  0.251  0.006  0.494  0.225  0.658 
   (0.173)  (0.347)  (0.283)*  (0.406)  (0.257)** 
Mother Some College  0.592  0.454  1.055  0.537  0.808 
   (0.200)***  (0.406)  (0.316)***  (0.469)  (0.297)*** 
Mother at least   0.613  0.603  1.138  0.718  0.557 
  College Degree  (0.216)***  (0.444)  (0.337)***  (0.507)  (0.321)* 
Absent from Class r  -1.325  -0.597  -0.413  -3.643  -0.748 
 More/All of the Time  (0.328)***  (0.700)  (0.526)  (0.831)***  (0.429)* 
Absent Some of Time  -0.636  -0.372  -0.452  -1.050  -0.748 
   (0.123)***  (0.249)  (0.197)**  (0.286)***  (0.186)*** 
Attentive in Class   1.661  2.316  1.359  1.277  1.719 
  Most/All of the Time  (0.228)***  (0.462)***  (0.343)***  (0.570)**  (0.334)*** 
Attentive Some of   0.712  1.224  0.412  -0.145  1.238 
   Time  (0.239)***  (0.479)**  (0.366)  (0.594)  (0.351)*** 
Limited English   -0.448  -1.358  -1.975  0.824  0.338 
   Proficient  (0.542)  (0.980)  (0.934)**  (1.456)  (0.794) 
Learning Disability  -2.472  -2.610  -1.261  -4.431  -1.899 
   (0.228)***  (0.438)***  (0.358)***  (0.578)***  (0.345)*** 
School and Class 
Characteristics            
School Size  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   (0.000)***  (0.000)**  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Percent of Students   -0.003  -0.005  -0.007  0.009  -0.009 
   Receive Free Lunch  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.006) 
Percent of Non-White   0.005  0.004  0.005  0.005  0.000 
   Students  (0.003)*  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.005) 
Minutes of Class Time   0.000  -0.001  0.001  -0.001  0.001 
  Per Week  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  
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Minutes of Lab Time   -0.004  -0.005  0.001  -0.009  0.001 
  Per Week  (0.002)**  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)**  (0.002) 
Class Size  0.009  0.008  0.015  0.047  0.008 
   (0.007)  (0.019)  (0.013)  (0.020)**  (0.012) 
Constant  4.086  6.049  -0.459  -4.714  3.243 
   (9.436)  (5.923)  (4.997)  (7.103)  (4.223) 
Observations  10546  3104  1800  2963  2679 
R-squared  0.209  0.114  0.226  0.130  0.191 
 
Standard errors in parentheses;*significant at 10%;** significant at 5%;*** significant at 1% 
Note: Regressions included dummy variables for the state in which a teacher is employed; 
also dummies for observations with missing data for each variable used in a regression. 
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Table 8: Comparing the Effect of Tenure Among Different Groups  
 
Regression 
Description 
Number of 
Observations 
Tenure 
Coefficient 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
T-
Statistic 
P-
Value 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
             
Full 
Regression, 
Subject 
Dummies 
           
Tenureexp≤22  n=12779  0.1244  0.2588  0.48  0.631   -0.3829 
0.6316 
Tenureexp≤10  n=8401  0.0096  0.3457  0.03  0.978   -0.6680 
0.6871 
Tenureexp≤5  n=6108  -0.0928  0.3608  -0.36  0.797   -0.8001 
0.6146 
             
English             
Tenureexp≤22  n=4322  -0.0056  0.4931  -0.01  0.991   -0.9724 
0.9612 
Tenureexp≤10  n=2867  -0.0633  0.6621  -0.1  0.924   -1.3615 
1.2348 
Tenureexp≤5  n=2063  -0.2948  0.7003  -0.42  0.674   -1.6683 
1.0786 
             
History             
Tenureexp≤22  n=2025  0.2941  0.4616  0.64  0.524   -0.6111 
1.1994 
Tenureexp≤10  n=1235  -0.1169  0.6353  -0.18  0.854   -1.3633 
1.1296 
Tenureexp≤5  n=887  -0.8235  0.6927  -1.19  0.235   -2.1832 
0.5363 
             
Math             
Tenureexp≤22  n=3427  0.2496  0.6300  0.4  0.692   -0.9858 
1.4849 
Tenureexp≤10  n=2364  -0.1153  0.8387  -0.14  0.891   -1.7600 
1.5294 
Tenureexp≤5  n=1757  0.1083  0.8930  0.12  0.903   -1.6432 
1.8599 
             
Science             
Tenureexp≤22  n=3005  -0.2237  0.4030  -0.56  0.579   -1.0139 
0.5665 
Tenureexp≤10  n=1935  -0.5495  0.5495  -0.98  0.326   -1.6467 
0.5477189 
Tenureexp≤5  n=1401  -0.3872  0.5832  -0.66  0.507   -1.5313 
0.7570 
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Appendix Table 1: Distribution of the Sample of Tenth Grade Teachers by Subject and 
Years of Experience at Current School of Employment 
 
      Number of Observations    
Years of 
Experience 
Relative to Earning 
Tenure  English   History  Math  Science  Total 
-5  29  13  9  5  56 
-4  39  9  42  17  107 
-3  295  126  230  223  874 
-2  294  164  283  247  988 
-1  351  145  289  198  983 
0  276  118  226  233  853 
1  294  133  286  176  889 
2  308  85  212  198  803 
3  209  105  186  118  618 
4  168  41  173  127  509 
5  163  96  102  104  465 
6  166  57  152  92  467 
7  204  92  143  158  597 
8  172  81  99  88  440 
9  149  77  115  103  444 
10  113  41  98  93  345 
11  133  51  63  81  328 
12  137  107  102  114  460 
13  194  74  106  102  476 
14  143  91  99  69  402 
15  111  78  119  77  385 
16  149  70  129  111  459 
17  141  79  92  184  496 
18  151  74  120  72  417 
19  148  83  130  127  488 
20  53  51  42  55  201 
21  95  32  61  78  266 
22  58  25  45  51  179 
23  47  27  52  49  175 
24  43  30  25  52  150 
25  33  32  32  44  141 
26  16  38  26  31  111 
27  45  17  23  6  91 
28  4  8  12  21  45 
29  12  6  9  6  33 
30+  22  15  34  5  76 
Total  4965  2371  3966  3515  14817 
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Appendix Table 2: Distribution of the Sample of Tenth Grade Teachers by State Tenure 
Laws 
 
Length of 
Probationary 
Period (year) 
Number of 
States with 
Probationary 
Period 
Length 
Number of 
Observations 
1  3  275 
2  12  4630 
3  32  8890 
4  1  239 
5  2  783 
 